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ABSTRACT
The question-statement, “All is number?”, the title of Zhmud’s famous 1989 article in 
Phronesis, opens a challenge to the extremely important Aristotelian testimony that “all 
is number” was the fundamental definition of Pythagorean philosophy. Such a challenge is 
anything but easy, especially when one considers that, so far, the histories of both ancient 
philosophy and ancient mathematics seem to have no doubts that this definition is correct. 
This paper aims to submit Aristotle’s claim that the Pythagoreans believed that “all is num-
ber” to critical review. Our analysis of the many ways in which Aristotle states the thesis that 
“all is number” will reveal, beyond merely semantic variations, a fundamental theoretical 
contradiction that Aristotle himself seems incapable of solving. Three different versions 
of the doctrine are in fact present in the Aristotelian doxography: (a) an identification of 
numbers with the sensible objects; (b) an identification of the principles of numbers with the 
principles of things that are; (c) an imitation of objects by numbers. While versions (a) and 
(c) seem to identify numbers with the material cause of reality, in terms (“imitation”) reminis-
cent of Plato, version (b), numbers as formal causes of reality, is an Aristotelian reconstruc-
tion of the Pythagorean theory. Aristotle would have been pushed to such a reconstruction 
by the difficulty he found in accepting the Pythagorean material notion of number, and by 
considering it closer to its sensitivity, strongly marked by the reception of that same theory 
in the Academic realm.
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RESUMO
A pergunta, “Tudo é número?” no título do famoso artigo de 1989 de Zhmud, deixa aberto 
um desafio para o extremamente importante testemunho aristotélico de que “tudo é nú-
mero” era a definição fundamental da filosofia pitagórica. Tal desafio não é nada simples, 
especialmente quando se considera que, até então, as histórias tanto da filosofia quanto 
da matemática antiga parecem não ter dúvidas de que esta afirmação é correta. Este artigo 
pretende submeter à avaliação crítica a alegação de Aristóteles de que os pitagóricos acre-
ditavam que “tudo é número”. Nossa análise dos muitos modos nos quais Aristóteles enun-
cia a tese de que “tudo é número” revelará, para além de variações meramente semânticas, 
uma contradição teórica fundamental que o próprio Aristóteles parece incapaz de resolver. 
De fato, três versões diferentes da doutrina estão presentes na doxografia aristotélica: 
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The Porphyrian summary and a 
significant absence
A Porphyrian summary of Pythagoras’ most famous 
doctrines immediately brings us to the heart of the problem: 
there is no escaping the fact that his account contains no ref-
erence to mathematics or astronomy, or even to cosmology or 
politics, despite the critical role these doctrines have played in 
the definition of Pythagoreanism in other strata of the tradi-
tion, in particular the Aristotelian texts.
Let us consider the passage:
Some of his [Pythagoras’] statements 
gained almost general notoriety: (1) that 
the soul is immortal, (2) that it transmi-
grates into other species of living beings, 
(3) that, periodically, what once happened, 
happens again, nothing is absolutely new, 
and (4) that all living things should be con-
sidered of the same genre. It seems that 
Pythagoras himself introduced these be-
liefs in Greece for the first time (Porph., VP: 
19, my translation). 
The absence of a reference to numerical theory is signif-
icant for understanding how to define the historiographical 
category of Pythagoreanism that otherwise seems to largely 
depend on a link to numbers. Such an absence suggests the 
need for a closer consideration of the history of the assign-
ment of a mathematical theory to ancient Pythagoreanism.
Although Zeller himself was confident that Philolaus’ 
theories that number is the essence of all things, along with 
the doctrines of harmony, the central fire, and the spheres, 
were core pillars of Pythagoreanism, contemporary criticism 
challenges the alleged Aristotelian dógma that in Pythago-
reanism, “all is number”. The interpretative tradition, led in 
recent times by Frank (1923), has become accustomed to re-
garding all Pythagorean mathematics as an Academic inven-
tion created after Philolaus’ fragments, which must be consid-
ered spurious. The influence of Frank’s skepticism is such that 
even Cherniss (1935), who disagrees with Frank about the 
value of Aristotle’s testimony, agrees with Frank’s interpreta-
tion of the connection between the Aristotelian dógma that 
“all is number” and ancient Pythagoreanism. The consensus 
of such scholars is e ecially impressive when it comes to the 
value to be given to Philolaus’ fragments, which we regard as 
one of the fundamental loci of this debate:
The fragments attributed to Philolaus are 
surely spurious, since they contain ele-
ments that cannot be older than Plato. 
Erich Frank has gathered the evidence 
against the fragments; and, apart from his 
own theory as to their origin and his con-
clusion of certain very weak arguments 
[…] his analysis makes it superfluous to re-
state the overwhelming case against them 
(Cherniss, 1935, p. 386).
More recently, authors like Burkert (1972, p. 238-277) 
and Kirk et al. (1983, p. 324) have subjected Frank’s argu-
ments to critical review. E ecially significant are Huffman’s 
efforts, both in his 1988 article and e ecially in his mono-
graph devoted entirely to Philolaus and the problem of the au-
thenticity of his fragments (Huffman, 1993)—the first book 
devoted entirely to the philosopher of Croton after Boeckh’s 
1819 monograph.2 This review offers new hermeneutical 
per ectives and, along with Zhmud’s recent studies (1989, 
1997, and now 2012 and 2013), represents a cornerstone in 
the definition of the place of mathematics in the construction 
of the Pythagorean tradition.3
(a) uma identificação dos números com objetos sensíveis; (b) uma identificação dos princí-
pios dos números com os princípios das coisas que existem; (c) uma imitação dos objetos 
pelos números. Enquanto as versões (a) e (c) parecem identificar, em termos que lembram 
Platão (‘imitação’), os números com a causa material da realidade, a versão (b), a saber, 
números como causas formais da realidade, é uma reconstrução aristotélica da teoria pita-
górica. Aristóteles teria sido levado a tal reconstrução pela dificuldade que encontrou para 
aceitar a noção pitagórica material de número, e por considerá-la, para seu gosto, forte-
mente marcada pela recepção da mesma teoria no ambiente da Academia. 
Palavras-chave: Filosofia Antiga, Pitagorismo, Aristóteles, números, ontologia. 
2 For general agreement with Frank’s skepticism, see, among others, Burnet (1908, p. 279-284) and Levy (1926, p. 70ff.). It is certainly not 
correct to agree, therefore, with Spinelli (2003, p. 145, n. 345), when he “dispatches” the question of the authenticity of the fragments 
in this way: “despite much that has been written for and against them, the whole argument is exposed, in an appropriate manner, only 
in the work of three writers: Bywater, Frank and Mondolfo.”
3 In truth, Frank himself, in his subsequent writings, retreating from a position which, in extreme and, in a sense, paralyzing skepticism, 
could not resist other scholars’ criticisms. In fact, in 1955, he readily admitted that “it can hardly be doubted that Pythagoras was the 
originator of this entire scientific development: he was a rational thinker rather than an inspired mystic” (Frank, 1955, p. 82). Neverthe-
less, in his review of Von Fritz’s book on Pythagorean politics, Frank’s skeptical verve is still strongly present (Frank, 1943).
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Three versions of the 
Pythagorean doctrine of numbers
The question-statement “All is number?”, the title of 
Zhmud’s famous 1989 article in Phronesis, opens a chal-
lenge to the extremely important Aristotelian testimony 
that “all is number” was the fundamental definition of Py-
thagorean philosophy.4 Such a challenge is anything but 
easy, especially when one considers that, so far, the histo-
ries of both ancient philosophy and ancient mathematics 
seem to have had no doubts that this definition is correct 
(see, Heath, 1921, p. 67; Guthrie, 1962, p. 229 ff.; Huffman, 
1988, p. 5, 1993, p. 57).
Reasons for this confidence are not absent. Indeed, in 
Aristotle, the assignment of the doctrine of “all is number” to 
the Pythagoreans is recurring and ultimately summarizes his 
interpretation of Pythagoreanism.
Aristotle states a number of times that:
(1)  “They thought the elements of numbers to be the 
elements of all things
(2)  and the whole heaven to be a harmony and a num-
ber” (Met. 986a 3).
(3)  “Numbers, as we said, are the whole heaven” (Met. 
986a 21).
(4)  “They say numbers are the things themselves” (Met. 
987b 28).
(5)  “Those [philosophers] say that things are numbers” 
(Met. 1083b 17).
(6)  “They’ve made the numbers to be things that be” 
(Met. 1090b 23).
Six times, Aristotle makes the Pythagoreans affirm that 
reality as a whole (tà ónta, tón hólon ouranón, tà prágmata) “is 
a number”.
In contrast, seven other times, Aristotle seems to suggest 
that the Pythagoreans say something slightly different:
(1)  “There is no other number than the number by 
which the world is constituted” (Met. 990a 21).
(2)  “For the Pythagoreans there is only the mathemati-
cal number, but they say that it is not separate and 
that, but that sensible substances are composed of it
(3)  because they build the entire heaven with numbers” 
(Met. 1080b 16-19).
(4)  “It is impossible to say that […] the bodies are made 
of numbers” (Met. 1083b 11).
(5)  “They assumed that real things are numbers, but not 
in a separate way, rather, that real things are com-
posed of numbers” (Met. 1090a 23-24).
(6)  “They derived the physical bodies from the num-
bers” (Met. 1090a 32).
(7)  “Those who believe that heaven is made of numbers 
reached the same result as them [the Pythagoreans]” 
(De caelo 300a 16).
In the above quotes, Aristotle makes the Pythagoreans 
claim more precisely that the foundation of the world is ex 
arithmôn, that is, that numbers are constitutive of and there-
fore immanent in the world.
This variability of the Aristotelian lectio marks his whole 
approach to Pythagoreanism (Burkert, 1972, p. 45). This is 
not the only case where Aristotle shows some difficulties in 
expressing Pythagorean doctrines in the terms of his philos-
ophy. Here the presentation of the doctrine of “all is number” 
by Aristotle is, at worst, contradictory, and at best presents 
three different versions.5 In addition to the first version, 
which identifies numbers with sensitive objects, two other 
versions are provided by Aristotle.
The second identifies the principles of numbers with the 
principles of the real things:
The so-called Pythagoreans are contempo-
rary and even prior to these philosophers 
[Leucippus and Democritus]. They have 
applied first in mathematics, making them 
grow, and nurtured by them, believed that 
their principles were the principles of all be-
ings (Met. 985b 23-26).
This claim is closely related to the above quote from 
Met. 986a 3, which is stated in terms of stoicheîa instead of 
archaí.
The third version is that real objects imitate numbers, 
as sugge ed by a famous passage in which a parallel is drawn 
with the Platonic conception of participation:
The Pythagoreans say that beings exist by 
imitating the numbers. Plato, on the con-
trary, says it is by participation, changing 
only the name. In any case, either one or the 
other neglected equally to indicate what 
participation and imitation of ideas mean 
(Met. 987b 11-14).
The first claim, that “things are numbers”, is clearly in-
consistent with the other two. Cherniss (1935, p. 387) rightly 
notes that Aristotle seeks to reconcile the first claim with the 
second, that numbers are principles of all things. His attempt 
depends on his claim that the Pythagoreans derived all of 
reality from the number one, a theory that is not present in 
the sources, and apparently confuses Pythagorean cosmology 
4 Although some suggestions in this direction had already been made by Huffman 1988 in his paper on the role of the number in Philo-
laus’ philosophy, the comments were not reported in Zhmud’s article (1989, p. 292, n. 62), because they were developed in parallel.
5 Cherniss (1935, p. 386), Zhmud (1989, p. 284-286) and Huffman (1993, p. 60) reproduce that same tripartion.
A review of Aristotle’s claim regarding Pythagoreans fundamental Beliefs: All is number?
Filosofi a Unisinos – Unisinos Journal of Philosophy – 17(1):50-57, jan/apr 2016 53
with their theory of numbers (Cherniss, 1935, p. 39). Aristo-
tle himself seems to recognize that this approach is bankrupt:
These philosophers also did not explain 
how the numbers are causes of substanc-
es and being. Are they causes as limits of 
greatness, and just as Eurytus established 
the number of each thing? (For example, a 
number for man, one for the horse, repro-
ducing with pebbles the shape of the living 
beings, similar to the numbers that refer to 
the figures of the triangle and the square 
[…] (Met. 1092b8-13).
Aristotle’s reference to Eurytus introduces a theory 
known as “numerical atomism”, according to which numbers 
are the real things because numbers (thought of as psêphoi, 
pebbles) are the material of which all real things are made. 
With good reason, indeed, Cherniss (1951) notes that in this 
way, numbers can identify any kind of phenomenal object:
Numbers are held to be groups of units, the 
units being material points between which 
there is ‘breath’ or a material ‘void’; and they 
quite literally all identified with phenomenal 
objects as aggregations of points, without, of 
course, considering whether these material 
points were themselves divisible or not. This 
was rather a materialization of number than 
a mathematization of nature, but it undoubt-
edly seemed to the Pythagoreans to be the 
only way of explaining the physical world in 
terms of those genuinely mathematical prop-
ositions which they had proved to be inde-
pendently valid  (Cherniss, 1951, p. 336).
Tannery (1887b, p. 258ff.), Cornford (1923, p. 7ff.) and 
even Cherniss (1935, p. 387), fascinated by Eurytus’s prim-
itive atomistic-numerical method, found it to be quite old. 
They all essentially follow Frank’s hypothesis (1923, p. 50) 
that the theory was borrowed by Archytas from Democritus. 
Not coincidentally, the citation from Met. 985b 23-26 refers 
to the atomists Leucippus and Democritus. Moreover, it has 
been sugge ed that some of Zeno’s arguments against plural-
ity presuppose a Pythagorean theory of numerical atomism. 
However, Burkert (1972, p. 285-288) and Kirk et al. (1983, 
p. 277-278) have raised serious doubts about this assignment, 
and there are many arguments for both views. However, we 
cannot mention all of them here.6
In any case, it is not hard to imagine that the material 
nature of Pythagorean numbers has an archaic sense, with-
out needing to postulate a theory of numerical atomism. 
This sense is summed up quite well by Nussbaum’s now clas-
sic definition:
[T]he notion of arithmós is always very 
closely connected with the operation of 
counting. To be an arithmós, something 
must be such as to be counted—which usu-
ally means that it must either have discrete 
and ordered parts or be a discrete part of a 
larger whole. To give the arithmós of some-
thing in the world is to answer the question 
‘how many’ about it. And when the Greek 
answers ‘two’ or ‘three’ he does not think of 
himself as introducing an extra entity, but as 
dividing or measuring the entities already in 
question (Nussbaum, 1979, p. 90).
On this interpretation, the number is still “itself a thing” 
(Burkert, 1972, p. 265). Burkert rightly notes, in the same 
context, that it should not be forgotten that the arithmos has 
a certain “aristocratic sound”, which refers to what “counts” 
in the sense of being important, “worthwhile” to count. The 
term can be so approximated to the pre-Socratic arche.
Thus, the second sense of “all is number”, by which the 
principles of numbers were the principles of all things, corre-
sponds more readily to what Cherniss (1935, p. 390) defines as 
an “Aristotelian construction of the Pythagorean theory.” Aris-
totle would have been led to this synthesis, on the one hand, by 
his difficulty in accepting the overly simplistic material notion 
of number as analogous with Eurytus’ pebbles, and on the other 
hand, by considering it more logical to understand the existence 
of Pythagorean numbers in the same way as the Platonists treat-
ed them, that is, by considering the arithmoí as archaí. But with 
this move, Aristotle shifts the problem of a Pythagorean theo-
ry of numbers into an Academic sphere. In fact, Frank (1923, 
p. 255) suggests that the source of this “misunderstanding” in 
Aristotle is in fact Speusippus; therefore, part of the Academy 
was deeply connected to the Pythagorean traditions. Speusip-
pus is directly quoted by Aristotle in the Metaphysics (1085a 33) 
when he mentions those “according to whom the point is not 
one, but similar to one” that is, hoíon tò hén. The point, in fact, 
plays a central role in Speusippus’ work; Speusippus was both a 
scholar of Philolaus and had openly declared that he based his 
writings on the latter. This statement is located in fragment 4 
(Lang), preserved by Nicomachus as part of his book On the 
Pythagorean numbers. This fragment is clear evidence of the 
Academic origin of the principles of the Pythagorean theory 
of numbers. In this vein, Speusippus asserts that “when consid-
ering the generation: the first principle from which greatness 
generates is the one, the second the line, the third the surface, 
the fourth the solid” (44 A 13 DK = Fr. 4 Lang).7
6 For arguments against Frank’s thesis, see Cherniss (1935, p. 388-389). For arguments against the controversial Zenonian thesis, see 
Burkert (1972, p. 285-289).
7 Cherniss (1935, p. 391) considers the probability of Aristotle having also derived entirely from Speusippus the list of opposites from 
Met. 986a 22, though simply as the most well-rounded list that was available to him—without denying, therefore, the possibility that 
there could be other lists that could be originally Pythagoreans.
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The first sense in which “all is number” also contradicts 
the third sense, that is, the idea of a mímēsis of the numbers 
by real objects. In fact, this thesis is mentioned by Aristotle 
only once (Met. 987b 11), in a passage in which the Pythag-
orean conception is identified with the Platonic one of par-
ticipation. This makes Cherniss (1935, p. 392) and Zhmud 
(1989, p. 186) consider it quite likely that Aristotle was trying 
to diminish the originality of the Platonic idea of méthexis by 
pointing to Aristoxenus, whose antagonism towards Plato is 
well atte ed. Indeed, Aristoxenus’ testimony reproduces the 
same idea of imitation: Pythagoras “likens all things to num-
bers” (fr. 23, 4 Wehrli, 1967).
In fact, other passages in Aristotle refer to something 
very similar to the concept of mímēsis by using words that 
involve a conception of similitude:
Since just in the numbers, precisely, more 
than in fire, earth and water, they thought 
they saw many similarities of what is and 
comes into being; for example, they be-
lieved that a certain property of numbers 
was justice, another soul and intellect, yet 
another the moment and opportunity and, 
in a few words, similarly with all other things 
(Met. 985b 27-32).
Therefore, it is in this sense of homoió-mata that the refer-
ence to mímēsis must be understood.8
The analogy between numbers and Eurytus’ pebbles 
(Met. 1092b 8-13) also relates to conceptions of similitude 
and imitation. Alexander of Aphrodisias, in his commentary 
on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, explains the reasoning that would 
have led to the imitative connection between justice and the 
number four:
Assuming that the specific nature of jus-
tice be proportionality and equality, and 
realizing that this property is present in 
numbers, for this reason the Pythagoreans 
used to say that justice is the first square 
number; […] This figure some used to say 
it was four, as it is the first square, and 
also because it is divided into equal parts 
and is equal to the product of these (in-
deed, it is two times two) (In Metaph. 38, 
10 Hayduck).
Burkert (1972, p. 44-45) notes that this conception of 
mímēsis, even if the terminology is Aristotle’s, must correspond 
to a pre-Platonic theory. The fundamental idea of magic or of 
Hippocratic medicine is that of a “two-way” match between 
two entities (body and cosmos, art and nature). In this  ecific 
case, there is a two-way match between the cosmos and num-
bers—the cosmos imitates numbers, and vice versa. Cornford 
(1922) considered this idea of imitation rather ancient, precise-
ly because of its mystical nature; he uses etymology (mîmos = 
actor) to connect the term to Dionysian cults and the fact that 
the protagonists of the cults play the role of god himself:
At that stage ‘likeness to God’ amounts to 
temporary identification. Induced by orgias-
tic means, by Bacchic ecstasy or Orphic sac-
ramental feast, it is a foretaste of the final 
reunion. In Pythagoreanism the conception 
is toned down, Apollinized. The means is no 
longer ecstasy or sacrament, but theo–ría, 
intellectual contemplation of the universal 
order (Cornford, 1922, p. 143).9
Against these hypotheses, however, the fact that Aristo-
tle does not actually indicate the imitation of prágmata, but of 
abstract realities such as justice, time, etc., plays an important 
role.10 In any case, even though one may concede that Aristo-
tle is here referring to a proto-Pythagorean, acousmatic, doc-
trine, in the following page (Met. 987b 29), he argues forcefully 
that the Pythagorean and Platonic notions of méthexis assigned 
to numbers differ.11 This would suggest, in this case, that a con-
troversial anti-Academic intention would perhaps be the most 
appropriate explanation of the reference to mímēsis.12
We can conclude that the three versions of the doctrine 
“all is number” (that of identification, of numbers as princi-
ples, and of imitation) are imperfectly articulated and ulti-
mately contradictory within Aristotle’s work.
However, it is significant that Aristotle never mentions 
that the three different lectiones of “all is number” belong to 
different groups of Pythagoreans. He seems to consider them, 
if not coherent among themselves, at least reconcilable, and 
refers to them all without distinction as defining the “so-
called Pythagoreans”.
Recognition of this fact has led several authors to adopt 
conciliatory solutions to the problem. First of all, Zeller himself. 
Although Zeller felt that Aristotle’s testimony should be read 
8 See for this approach Centrone (1996, p. 107-108).
9 Casertano (2009, p. 67) also agrees with the possibility of this “mystic numbers” origin.
10 Burnet (1908, p. 119), on the other hand, warns that one should not take these passages seriously: “They are mere sports of the 
analogical fancy.”
11 The term “proto-Pythagoreanism” is introduced here as a new term because it is necessary to distinguish between this first founding 
moment of Pythagoreanism and the development of Pythagoreanism during the fifth century BC, which is still “pre-Socratic,” but which 
is in writing and corresponds to the era of the immediate sources of Plato and Aristotle. For the uses and meaning of the analogous term 
“proto-philosophy”, see Boas (1948, p. 673-684).
12 This is also one of the reasons forcing one to reject Burnet’s hypothesis (1908, p. 355) and Taylor (1911, p. 178ff.), taken up also by 
Delatte (1922, p. 108ff), whereby Pythagoras would be the inventor of the theory of the Platonic forms. Thus, Burnet (1908, p. 355): “the 
doctrine of ‘forms’ (eíde–, idéai) originally took shape in Pythagorean circles, perhaps under Sokratic influence.”
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with all due care, its historical proximity to the Pythagorean 
doctrines should support its authenticity. Thus, for Zeller:
No doubt that in Aristotle’s exposure we 
must seek first of all and only his own way 
of seeing, and not an actual and immediate 
testimony of reality, however even in this 
case [that of the numerical theory], every-
thing speaks in favor of a recognition of the 
fact that his way of seeing was based on a 
direct knowledge of the actual connection of 
the very ideas of Pythagoreanism (Zeller and 
Mondolfo, 1938, p. 486, my translation).
Frank (1923, p. 77, n. 196) and Rey (1933, p. 116), seek-
ing to show the possibility of the compatibility of the three 
versions of “all is number”, imagine that Aristotle understood 
the different versions to be logically derived from one anoth-
er. Rey draws up a proposed compromise between the ver-
sion of numbers being the things and that of numbers imitat-
ing things: numbers would be things when considering their 
nature and would imitate things when one considers their 
properties (Rey, 1933, p. 356ff.).13 More elaborate is Raven’s 
conciliatory argument (1966 [1948], p. 43-65), whereby:
To suppose, as so many scholars appear to 
suppose, that Aristotle was hopelessly con-
fused about it, is not only to lay a very seri-
ous charge at his door, but also, incidentally, 
to demolish the main basis upon which any 
reliable reconstruction of Pythagoreanism 
must be erected (Raven, 1966 [1948], p. 63).
In an open controversy with Cornford (1923, p. 10) and 
his idea that Aristotle failed to distinguish two moments of Py-
thagoreanism (a first one on the idea of the materiality of num-
bers, and a second one where the Pythagoreans would be more 
concerned with the numerical make-up of reality), Raven in-
stead proposes a radical inseparability of the dual use of these 
senses within ancient Pythagoreanism.14 Aristotle would thus 
simply be getting a conception of nature as “equal to numbers” 
from Pythagoreanism, that is, constituted by an aggregation of 
spatially extended units (Raven, 1966 [1948], p. 62). However, 
numbers would not constitute only the matter of reality, but 
would also be the origin of the qualitative differences that dis-
tinguish each material object from others. This is the only way 
one might think either version of the imitation and of the num-
ber of the principles as articulated with the first version.15
At the very least we can say that the idea of mímēsis that 
Aristotle attributed to the Pythagoreans shares little with the 
Platonic conception of mímēsis according to which phenom-
enal realities mimic the forms, in the sense of being “similar 
to” supra-sensible realities of a higher ontological level. If this 
observation is correct, what Aristotle must attribute to the 
Pythagoreans when  eaking of mímēsis cannot be anything 
other than a generic correspondence between things and the 
numerical relationships that explain them and make them in-
telligible. Casertano summarizes the matter very well:
Immanent intelligibility, therefore, and not 
transcendent to the same things. This is why 
the Pythagorean formula, ‘things are num-
bers’ and ‘things are similar to numbers’, 
are not contrasted, but rather are expres-
sions of the same basic intuition, which is 
one of homogeneity between reality and 
thought, between the laws of reality and the 
laws of thought: to comprehend things is 
essentially to mirror them, to reproduce at 
the mental level that fully intelligible struc-
ture, which is characteristic of material real-
ity (Casertano, 2009, p. 65, my translation).
Although the fundamental insight of the Pythagoreans, 
an attempt to understand the nature of numbers by analo-
gy with the nature of the world, is clear, the fact is that the 
Aristotelian attempt to reconcile the different versions of the 
theory does not seem at all successful.
If, moreover, we think that the main version of the Py-
thagorean doctrine, that of the identity of number with real-
ities, pays obeyance directly to the controversial intention of 
Aristotle with regards to Platonism, making him consider the 
Pythagorean arithmós a material cause, in opposition to the 
Platonic militancy in favor of its being a formal cause (Cherniss, 
1935, p. 360), this makes it difficult to appeal to the Aristo-
telian “all is number” as a genuine and pure piece of historio-
graphical evidence for the foundations of Pythagoreanism.16
Difficult, but not impossible, I would say.
First solution: 
The Aristotelian reduction
In fact, two solutions have been proposed to the prob-
lem of whether Aristotle’s claim that “all is number” accurate-
ly describes Pythagorean philosophy.
The first engages in a radical challenge of the validity of 
the Aristotelian testimony, even coming to deny that a doc-
13 For the criticism of Frank’s and Rey’s proposal, see both Cherniss (1935, p. 386) and Burkert (1972, p. 44, n. 86).
14 Cornford (1923, p. 10) says in effect that: “Aristotle himself draws attention to the two diverse ways of making numbers ‘the causes of 
substances and being’, which, in my view, are characteristic of the two different schools of Pythagoreans”.
15 See Guthrie (1962, p. 230f.) for a similar idea.
16 Centrone (1996, p. 105) notes in this sense that “l’interesse [di Aristotele] per il pitagorismo, i cui pregi in definitiva consistono solo 
nell’assenza dei difetti propri della filosofia dei platonici, non è soverchiante, ed è anzi determinado proprio dalle affinitità con le dot-
trine platoniche”.
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trine of number belongs tout court in proto-Pythagoreanism. 
There is no lack of reasons for this challenge, and they center 
on the fact that no testimonies earlier than Aristotle attest to 
this doctrine. Zhmud’s article (1989), quoted above, begins 
with this argument, and we will follow it step-by-step.
Zhmud’s article operates in the context of determining 
the criteria for identification as a Pythagorean. His funda-
mental concern is to consider the impression that the Aris-
totelian text seems to give, that is, that “someone who  eaks 
of numbers” would be the best definition of a Pythagorean. 
The use of the criterion of numbers to identify a Pythagore-
an (Zhmud, 1989, p. 272) would be either circular or ques-
tion-begging. Indeed, despite several attempts in this regard, 
no historian—says Zhmud—has succeeded in finding any 
doctrine about numbers in the pre-Aristotelian sources on 
Pythagoreanism (Zhmud, 1989, p. 272). 
With these arguments in mind, Zhmud admits only 
two possible explanations for Aristotle’s testimony: either the 
expression “all is number” belongs to an ancient and secret 
teaching of the “divine” Pythagoras, which must have been 
directly revealed to Aristotle and first published by him, or 
the expression “all is number” was not actually a Pythagorean 
doctrine.17 This second possibility corresponds to the classic 
position of Burnet, in which “Pythagoras himself left no de-
veloped doctrine on the subject, while the Pythagoreans of 
the fifth century did not care to add anything of the sort to 
the school tradition” (Burnet, 1908, p. 119).18
Although not surprising, given the aforementioned 
studies of Cherniss suggesting that Aristotle’s own “historio-
graphic” method freely reformulated the doctrines of his pre-
decessors in his own terms, it is important to ask what would 
make Aristotle falsely attribute such a doctrine of “all is num-
ber” to the Pythagoreans.
Our arguments so far have given a crude first response to 
this question. Aristotle was faced with a great diversity of Py-
thagorean sources, both ancient (Hippasus) and closer to him 
(Ecphantus, Philolaus, Archytas). However, for purposes in-
ternal to Aristotle’s Metaphysics, this plethora of Pythagoreans 
needed to be brought back to a common denominator, under 
a school that would somehow fit into the theoretical-historical 
course that Aristotle intended to draw on in his doxography.
Without reducing Pythagoreanism to a set of core theo-
retical doctrines, it would have been impossible to find a place 
for it inside the agonic model by which Aristotle describes 
the history of his predecessors (Cherniss, 1935, p. 349). For 
example, only in this way could the Pythagorean arché– be an 
antagonist of the Ionic material cause. At the same time, ter-
minological imprecision in the Pythagorean sources (which 
Aristotle himself complains about in Met. 1092b 1-13) allows 
the postulation of Pythagorean numbers as the precursor of 
the Platonic formal cause. Even if number did not already 
have this dual valence, Aristotle would probably have invent-
ed it, for it fits to perfection within his doxographic model.
Thus, the postulation that “all is number” would have 
been Aristotle’s solution to a historiographical problem, and 
in some ways the beginning of a long tradition which, starting 
with Zeller (Zeller and Mondolfo, 1938, p. 435), reduced the 
category of Pythagoreanism to the narrow limits of this meta-
physical doctrine.
Second Solution: Philolaus
The first solution leaves us at a hermeneutic impasse: 
Aristotle himself invented a historiographic category (“the 
so-called Pythagoreans”) and a doctrinal common denomi-
nator defining it (“all is number”). A second solution seeks to 
avoid tracing the category back to a mere invention by under-
taking a reassessment of the Pythagorean sources of the fifth 
century BC for possible historical references to Aristotle’s 
term “so-called Pythagoreans”.
Starting from an important observation: the great number 
of references to Pythagoreanism and their theory of numbers 
in Aristotle reveals an indisputable fact: Aristotle must have re-
ally had several Pythagorean texts on his desk.19 The certainty 
with which Aristotle presents some statements about the Py-
thagoreans seems to presuppose his access to a sufficiently broad 
literature of their authorship. Consider the debate on whether 
the Pythagoreans considered the world to be generated or not. 
Aristotle says it is impossible to doubt it: “There is no reason to 
doubt whether the Pythagoreans do or do not introduce gener-
ation of things which are eternal” (Met. 1091a 13). Likewise, he 
appears to be absolutely certain that the Pythagoreans had not 
philosophized about sensible bodies: “They did not say anything 
about fire nor earth, or on other bodies” (Met. 990a 16-17).
Moreover, tradition informs us that Aristotle devoted 
at least two books to the Pythagoreans, not to mention the 
works devoted  ecifically to Pythagoras or particular Py-
thagoreans such as Archytas.20 Any account of who the “so-
called Pythagoreans” to whom Aristotle wants to assign the 
doctrine of numbers were depends, for the most part, on the 
possibility of identifying the subjects of these books. Howev-
er, tradition only tells us of books on Philolaus and Archytas. 
As Aristotle seems to deal with Archytas separately from the 
rest of pythagoreans, it is likely that the books of Philolaus 
constitute Aristotle’s Pythagorean sources.
17 So says Zhmud (1989, p. 275): “If we do not wish to think that the central dogma of Pythagorean philosophy was secret, then it would 
be quite reasonable to suppose: either this dogma was not central, or it was not a dogma at all. Only very few of those who write about 
Pythagorean philosophy arrive at such a paradoxical conclusion.” On the practice of secrecy in the earlier Pythagorean community, see 
Cornelli (2013, p. 71ss.).
18 Gigon (1945, p. 142) follows the same idea.
19 Burkert (1972, p. 236), Zhmud (1989, p. 281), Huffman (1993, p. 57) and Centrone (1996, p. 105) agree on this.
20 For extensive discussion of these works and references, see Burkert (1972, p. 29, n. 5).
A review of Aristotle’s claim regarding Pythagoreans fundamental Beliefs: All is number?
Filosofi a Unisinos – Unisinos Journal of Philosophy – 17(1):50-57, jan/apr 2016 57
It is important to point out, again, that it is no won-
der that this same methodological conclusion has not been 
reached before, that is, the problem to which the doctrine 
“all is number” was intended as a solution was the study of 
Philolaus’ fragments. Much of the tradition, beginning with 
Cherniss himself (1935, p. 386), could not pursue this direc-
tion because the texts of Philolaus were considered spuri-
ous in the wake of Frank 1923. Only after the “rediscovery” 
of the value of an essential part of Philolaus’ fragments, first 
with Burkert (1972, p. 218ff.), and then with Huffman (1988, 
1993), did that path become possible.
The recent reassessment of the historical value of Philo-
laus’ fragments, therefore, allows new, previously impossible, 
hermeneutical steps.
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